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Abstract. The efficient market hypothesis has been around since 1962, the theory is based 
on a simple rule, namely that the price of any asset must fully reflect all available 
information.Yet there is empirical evidence financial markets are too volatile to be efficient. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the reaction to events is the crucial factor, rather than 
the actual information. Generally, market participants react differently to negative and 
positive market shocks, hinting at asymmetrical effects. This paperanalyses the impact of 
asymmetrical effects on the efficiency of the financial market during the recent crises. We 
test the efficiency of the financial markets using the daily prices of the GIPS sovereign 
debts between June 2007 and December 2011. This allowed us to test the efficiency during 
the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis periods. We used a GJR-GARCH based 
variance bound test based on the test derived by Fakhry & Richter (2015). Our tests provide 
evidence forfinancial markets being too volatile to be efficient. At the same time, the results 
are pointing towards bounded rationality rather than irrationality. 
Keywords. Efficient market hypothesis, Volatility tests, Asymmetrical effect, GJR-
GARCH, Sovereign debt market, Crises. 
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1. Introduction 
he efficient market hypothesis has been the cornerstone of asset pricing 
since the early, developed through prominence articles such as Malkiel 
(1962) and Fama (1965; 1970). However as suggested by Fakhry & Richter 
(2015), the efficient market hypothesis relies on some untestable assumptions and 
models like perfectly competitive markets and rational risk averse profit 
maximising market participants. Hence, as suggested by Ball (2009), there have 
been many objections from policy makers and academics, especially in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Yet as hinted by Fakhry & Richter (2015), it is 
possible to test the efficiency of the market through the use of the Shiller volatility 
test as derived by Shiller (1981a). Conversely, the momentum in the 1990s of 
behavioural finance also highlighted the issues surrounding the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
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As hinted by Black (1976), a key observation made primarily in stock markets, 
there is a negative correlation between returns and volatility. Thus meaning a 
negative movement has a greater impact than a positive movement of similar 
magnitude on the volatility. Therefore, suggesting market participants react 
differently to negative and positive shocks. The importance of this is it may have 
an impact on the efficiency of the market. Fakhry & Richter (2015) highlighted a 
different effect on the efficiency of the market due to the environment. This would 
suggest that efficiency of the market is based on the reaction of market participants.   
Hence, we propose to extend Fakhry & Richter (2015) by using the GJR-GARCH 
model of volatility as the basis of variance bound test, hence introducing the 
asymmetrical volatility test.  
As we are analysing the impact of asymmetrical effects on the efficient market 
hypothesis, we start this paper with two short reviews of the recent empirical 
evidence of market efficiency and asymmetrical effects. The next section gives 
methodology of the asymmetrical volatility test. Section 5and 6 presents the data 
and empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Recent Empirical Evidence on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis 
In testing the efficient market hypothesis, a common test is to test whether 
markets follow the random walk model and prices incorporate information 
immediately. The variance ratio tests of Lo & MacKinlay (1988) allow the testing 
of the random walk model, the influencing assumptionin the weak form efficient 
market hypothesis. However, a key factor is as stated by Fama (1970; 1991), any 
test of the efficient market hypothesis involves a joint hypothesis of the equilibrium 
expected rates of returns and market rationality.  Thus, there is a need to review the 
variance bound test of Shiller (1979) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) which states any 
excess volatility in the price of any asset is the result of inefficient markets as 
argued by Shiller (1992). This would mean that in a rational market, fundamental 
information is not the driving force of the price and inefficiency in the market 
drives the price away from the long-term equilibrium. 
The rationale of the volatility tests is a comparison of the variability of prices 
with the variability of the future cash flows. The basic argument is that in an ideal 
world, future cash flows should determine the behaviour of prices today; therefore, 
as Shiller (1992) argues, any excess volatility is evidence of inefficient markets.  
As emphasized by LeRoy (1989), the underlining factor of the volatility or 
variance bound tests is that market efficiency dictates that asset price volatility 
should be relatively low in comparison with returns volatility. Another key factor, 
highlighted by LeRoy (1989), is there exists a negative relationship between the 
variances of the asset price and returns given the amount of information market 
participants have. Empirical evidence from Shiller (1979; 1981b) and LeRoy & 
Porter (1981) suggests asset prices are more volatile than is consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
Shiller (1981a) suggested using conventional regression techniques and the F-
test on the resulting coefficients. However, based on the assumptions made earlier, 
it can be shown that volatility test have more power under certain circumstances.  
Nevertheless, as pointed by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) the use of 
ARCH/GARCH models in the estimation process can overcome seasonality in 
fundamentals and volatility clustering issues. 
In general, there is a large body of empirical literatures on the efficiency of the 
financial market. A large percentage of these are based on the stock market, the 
recent evidence on the efficiency of the stock market is mixed. Some found the 
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stock market to be inefficient; an example is Cajueiro et al. (2009) who found the 
liberalization of the Greek stock market made it significantly less efficient. 
However, the evidence from Cuthbertson & Hyde (2002) seem to suggest the 
acceptance of the EMH for the French stock market and slightly less so for the 
German.  
In comparison, the body of empirical literatures on the efficiency of the 
sovereign debt market is limited despite the first model of international efficient 
market being based on the French sovereign debt market as stated by Zunino et al. 
(2012). As Zunino et al. (2012) suggest the main reasons are the size of trading on 
the stock market and the type of trading for the sovereign debt market, mainly 
traded “over-the-counter”. Like the stock market, the recent empirical evidence on 
efficiency in the sovereign debt market is mixed. Zunino et al. (2012) using 
sovereign debt indices found that developed markets tend to be more efficient than 
emerging markets.  
Fakhry & Richter (2015) studied the impact of the recent financial and 
sovereign debt crises on the US and German sovereign debt markets and found 
both markets were too volatile to be efficient. Although the US datasets do suggest 
the market may be efficient over the entire sample, subsamples suggest a mixed 
results pointing to both crises having an impact on the efficiency of the US and 
German markets. Conversely, Fakhry et al. (2016) extending the method used in 
Fakhry & Richter (2015) to the GIPS markets, also find mixed evidence of 
efficiency during the crises. This leads to a possible explanation of the efficiency of 
the US datasets using the behavioural finance theory. Since market participants 
were overreacting/underreacting to information during different periods, one 
possible conclusion is that the overreaction/underreaction cancel each other out 
leading to a stable state in the datasets giving the impression of market efficiency. 
 
3. The Empirical Evidence on the Asymmetrical Effect in 
the Sovereign Debt Market 
A key observation made primarily in stock markets and also to a lesser extent in 
the sovereign debt market, there is a negative correlation between returns and 
volatility as hinted by Black (1976). Thus meaning a negative movement has a 
greater impact than a positive movement of similar magnitude on the volatility.  
Glosten et al. (1993) proposed a model, aka GJR-GARCH, extending the GARCH-
m model to allow for asymmetries in the conditional variance, thus generalising the 
GARCH-m to model the leverage-feedback effect.  It is essential to note that the 
GARCH-m is integrated into the GJR-GARCH model which mean that when there 
is no leverage effects the model collapses to a GARCH-m. 
However, another model often used to estimate the leverage effect is the 
EGARCH proposed by Nelson (1991). The key different is that unlike many other 
GARCH models where the need arises to constraints the coefficients to ensure the 
positive conditional variance, the EGARCH model uses the log of the conditional 
variance. However, as Bollerslev (2008) notes the inclusion of the log of the 
conditional variance complicates the unbiased forecasts for the future variances.  
The leverage or asymmetrical effect is well documented in the stock markets 
but little empirical evident have been documented in the sovereign debt market e.g. 
Dungey et al. (2009), especially with the GJR-GARCH. In a sense Dungey et al. 
(2009) is interesting not only due to the leverage effect research in the sovereign 
debt market but also to the flight to quality effect. Dungey et al. (2009) analyse the 
leverage effect of flight to quality in respect to the US Treasuries market. Using the 
asymmetric GARCH model TGARCH (or TARCH) proposed by Zakoian (1994), 
they explain the positive sign asymmetries find in most flights to quality. During 
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any period of uncertainty such as the recent banking crisis, increasingly risk averse 
market participants tend to sell high-risk assets and buy low risk assets. As noted 
by Dungey et al. (2009), this leads to low risk asset markets, such as the US 
Treasuries, exhibiting positive sign asymmetries i.e. „a positive price shock in the 
low risk asset may generate a disproportionately large volatility response‟. While 
the high risk asset will suffer from negative asymmetries. 
Recently much of the empirical evident have concentrated on the volatility 
during the financial or sovereign debt crisis and their effect on the Eurozone.  It is 
important to note that the underlying issue in most of these researches is the effect 
of the crises on the integration of the financial markets within the Eurozone.  
Another key issue studied is the contagious effect of the crises especially among 
the GIIPS nations within the Eurozone due to monetary unification. Good 
examples of such studies on the effect of the recent crises on the volatility within 
the Eurozone are Dotz & Fisher (2011), Metui (2011), Tamakoshi (2011) and Mohl 
& Sondermann (2013). 
In a paper researching contagion among the Eurozone sovereign debt markets, 
Metui (2011) employ the GJR-GARCH model to analyse the effect of news on 
spread volatility relative to the US Treasury 10 year note yields. They use daily 10-
year benchmark yields from 11 core, Eurozone and the US markets obtained from 
Datastream between 1April 1999 and 29 April 2011. In concluding, the results 
seem to be suggesting a strong leverage effect for all countries; hinting at a surprise 
increase in the yield premia having greater impact than a surprise decline. Using 
timeline analysis they illustrate that volatility in the one period ahead 95% VaR 
seem to correspond with the periods of high financial distress during the recent 
financial and following sovereign debt crises. They find statistical evident of 
contagion in the Eurozone during a credit crisis in one or more countries. This last 
statement is of importance due to the integrated markets meaning sovereign debt 
crises in small open economies such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal can become 
systematically important due to contagion links. Concluding, they argue for the 
implementation of an early warning mechanism for market participants in the 
sovereign debt market; implementing a periodic stress test on sovereign borrowers. 
In an empirical research into the volatility spillover effect of 10-year sovereign 
debt yields during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, Tamakoshi (2011) use a 
number of AR (k)-EGARCH (p, q) model specifications to fit each of the seven 
datasets.  Theyuse daily 10-year yield data from seven Eurozone members (i.e. 
GIIPS plus Germany and France) observed over the period between 1 January 2007 
and 31 March 2011. He concludes that the analysis points to the existence of short-
term spillover effects across the seven Eurozone countries with the biggest pre-
crisis spillover coming from Portugal and France. However, the biggest post-crisis 
spillover comes from Portugal and Italy. Although Germany remains the strongest 
economy and has the best credit rating driven by strong sound fiscal policies, yet 
the evident seem to hint at volatility spillover effect from Germany on some 
Eurozone long-term bond yields. Concluding, this finding has important 
implications for portfolio diversification in the Eurozone sovereign debt markets. 
In a study by Mohl & Sondermann (2013) on the impact of political 
communication on the spreads of the GIIPS nations relative to the German 
benchmark yields during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. They use an 
EGARCH model to measure the conditional mean and variance among three 
categories of political communications concerning restructuring, bailout and the 
European Financial Stability Facility. They use the daily spreads and news over the 
period between 1
st
 May 2010 and 30
th
 June 2011 from Haver and a number of news 
agencies (i.e. Bloomberg, Dow Jones Newswire, Market News International and 
Reuters). The results seem to be hinting at a limited impact on statements 
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concerning bailouts. However, statements concerning restructuring increased 
volatility and the EFSF decreased volatility. Their results seem to be indicating 
statements from major contributing nations about the restructuring seem to have 
more impact than receiving nations. In contrast, statements on the EFSF from 
receiving countries have a larger negative impact on the conditional volatility.  In 
concluding, they state that political communication played a key role in the 
Eurozone crisis. They extend their finding by supporting the calls for an improve 
communication discipline. 
 
4. The Model Specification of the Asymmetrical Volatility 
Test 
The main aim of this paper is to extend the test for the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) used in Fakhry & Richter (2015) to account for the 
asymmetrical effect. We proposed an asymmetrical variance bound test by 
extending Fakhry & Richter (2015) using a GJR-GARCH variant of the variance 
bound test proposed by Shiller (1979; 1981a). We use the 5% critical value F-
statistics to test the efficient market hypothesis. Although Shiller does advocate the 
use of such methodology, yet he does not specify a specific econometric model. 
There are a number of pre-requisite steps in the model specification of the test: 
1. As illustrated by Shiller (1981a), the key factor underlying any variance bound 
test is the variance calculation.  We model the datasets in our test as a time varying 
lagged variance of the price using equation 1. We used the 20 lagged system 
advocated by Fakhry & Richter (2015). 
 
lim𝑡→𝑇 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 =
  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 −𝜇 2
𝑄
𝑞=1
𝑄
       (1) 
 
2. The first order autoregressive model estimates the residuals in the 
econometric model underpinning the test as illustrated by equation 2. 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡       (2) 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡  
 
We opt to use the GJR-GARCH model in our tests.  An influencing factor in the 
GJR-GAARCH model is the asymmetrical order, which we set to one.  Hence, we 
estimate a GJR-GARCH (1, 1) using equation 2. 
 
ℎ𝑗𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼 1𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽 1ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑘𝑡−1𝐼 𝜀𝑗𝑡 −1 < 0      (3) 
 
An added and interesting factor with the GJR=GARCH is that we could see 
whether asymmetrical effect has any impact on the efficiency of the market. The 
key is the 𝛾 coefficient in equation 3 where 𝛾 ≠ 0 then there is an asymmetrical 
effect; if 𝛾 > 0  then there is a leverage effect meaning negative shocks have 
greater effect than positive shocks. 
As noted by Alexander (2008, p. 137) and Engle & Patton (2001), there is a 
story within any member of the GARCH family of volatility models influenced by 
the coefficients in the variance equation. This means the reaction and mean 
reversion of the market shocks to volatility can be naturally interpreted by the two 
remaining coefficients in equation 3. However, due to the use of the variance of the 
price as the independent variable in the mean equation, we cannot use the true 
definition.  This means the use of the price variance had the impact of hiking the α 
coefficient leading to a massive increase in the volatility‟s sensitivity to market 
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shocks. In contrast, the β coefficient decreased significantly leading to massive 
downgrade in the persistence of the volatility in the aftermath of a crisis in the 
market.   
The coefficients of the GJR-GARCH model of volatility are also key to our 
asymmetrical variance bound test.  As mentioned earlier in this section, we derive 
our EMH test by using the f-statistics; for our observed samples, the f-statistics at 
the 5% level is 1.96.  We calculate our test statistics using equation 4: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝐻𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
 𝛼+𝛽+𝛾 −1
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑟  𝑥  
≤ 𝐹𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠     (4) 
 
By definition, the market is efficient when the condition as set in equation 4 is 
true.  Theoretically, the market is only truly efficient when the EMH test statistics 
is equal to the f-statistic. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis for the EMH if the 
condition in equation 4 is true but accept the null hypothesis of the market being 
too volatile to be efficient for anything else. 
 
5. Data Description 
This section aims to provide empirical evidence of the impact of the crises on 
the efficiency of the financial market.  The section will analyse the GIPS sovereign 
debts markets over a 10-year notes observed from 1
st
 June 2007 to 30
th
 December 
2011 meaning a uniformed 1196 daily observations for each sovereign debt market.   
In order to analyse the efficiency of the sovereign debt market under different 
global market conditions, we subdivide our observed markets into the following 
periods: financial crisis of the late 2000s and sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s. 
As illustrated by table 1, we use the daily 10-year sovereign debt, maturing in 
201F2, end of day bid prices for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain obtained from 
Bloomberg. We follow the norm by defining our week as Monday to Friday.  In 
order to make the observed data uniformed across all observed datasets, we 
substitute all missing observations with the last known price.  
 
Table 1. The 10-Year Sovereign Debt Prices Data 
 Reference Number Download Date Issue Date Maturity Date 
Greece GR0124018525 17/12/2012 17/01/2002 18/05/2012 
Italy IT0003190912 16/07/2012 01/08/2001 01/02/2012 
Portugal PTOTEKOE0003 16/07/2012 12/06/2002 15/06/2012 
Spain ES0000012791  17/12/2012 14/05/2002 30/07/2012 
 
6. Empirical Evidence 
As indicated earlier, the keys to the EMH test statistic are the coefficients and 
standard deviation of the model of volatility.  Hence, in essence, the model used 
determines the EMH test statistic; in the previous section, we used a GARCH (1, 1) 
model.  In this section, we propose an alternative model to estimate the coefficients 
and standard errors, the GJR-GARCH model. An influencing factor in the used of 
the GJR-GARCH is the use of the asymmetrical effect to analyse whether our 
EMH test responses differently to negative and positive shocks. 
With three exceptions, the model is a single lagged and asymmetrical order 
GJR-GARCH model with a student t distribution estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood method with a BHHH optimization algorithm. However, due to an error 
in the Portuguese market with the estimation in table 3, we used normal 
distribution and Marquandt optimization. 
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6.1. Financial Crisis Period (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
Table 2 illustrate the impact from the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  In mid-
2007 a number of international banks (e.g. Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas) recorded 
losses on their off-balance sheet activities associated with the MBS or CDO, which 
resulted in flights to liquidity and quality.  As the financial crisis spread, the credit 
market froze therefore non-financial corporations could not find the money 
required and hence the crisis spread to the equity and corporate bonds market. In 
essence, this meant an increase in market activities in the observed markets as 
market participants sought the safety of the sovereign debt market.   
During the financial crisis period, the asymmetrical coefficients were hinting at 
a leverage effect for all the observed markets. With the exception of the Greek 
market, the effect seems to be significant.  Given that during the financial crisis the 
prices of sovereign debt did consistently deviate from the expected price due to 
market participants engaging in flight to safety from risky assets such as MBS, 
CDO and shares and bonds of financial firms. It is worth remembering that the 
prices of these assets plummeted, especially in the aftermath of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy on 15
th
 September 2008, an example is the Dow Jones 
Average index, which fell from 13,950 on 16
th
 July 2007 to 6,547 on 9
th
 March 
2009. It must be noted that as previously stated the size and liquidity of the Greek 
market meant that the impact from any event during the financial crisis did not 
have a large impact on the asymmetrical coefficient which meant a near zero 
leverage effect. 
 
Table 2. EMH Test Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
 Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
0.015970 
(0.000487) 
0.001989 
(0.000257) 
0.005261 
(0.000405) 
0.002262 
(0.000248) 
b 
0.998053 
(0.001793) 
0.997661 
(0.001765) 
0.991626 
(0.001820) 
1.000558 
(0.001707) 
u 
0.781356 
(0.012194) 
0.799973 
(0.011800) 
0.819527 
(0.013501) 
0.713470 
(0.013905) 
Variance 
Equation 
ω 
1.49E-05 
(2.94E-06) 
4.49E-06 
(9.00E-07) 
1.49E-05 
(2.50E-06) 
4.19E-06 
(1.08E-06) 
α 
1.56118 
(0.245778) 
1.844676 
(0.335691) 
1.51262 
(0.275942) 
2.257028 
(0.462730) 
β 
0.089461 
(0.026248) 
0.061464 
(0.023683) 
0.075603 
(0.023654) 
0.098107 
(0.027931) 
γ 
-0.044722 
(0.368074) 
-0.113284 
(0.430284) 
-0.209147 
(0.331943) 
-0.177109 
(0.520074) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 1675.797 2016.549 1817.726 1794.128 
R2 0.976535 0.980444 0.978762 0.978033 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat 0.226378 0.296900 0.282623 0.283269 
ARCH Effect 4.926133 0.156402 1.488080 0.019445 
Jarque=Bera 81.04782 333.7555 77.13293 2278.619 
Standard 
Deviation 0.189977 0.116066 0.157186 0.141228 
EMH Test 
EMH Test 
Statistics 
 
3.189433 
 
6.831079 
 
2.41164 
 
8.341306 
Efficiency Reject Reject Reject Reject 
 
The α coefficients are interesting because they reflect the different impacts of 
the financial crisis on the observed sovereign debt markets. Interestingly, the 
Spanish mark 0.001820et, which was the most affected by the financial crisis 
within the Eurozone, and does point to a significantly large level of sensitivity to 
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market shocks. However, with the possible exception of the Italian market, the 
sensitivity levels of the remaining markets did not increase significantly. As 
explained in Fakhry et al. (2016), the Greek and Portuguese markets are not as 
liquid as the other observed markets. However, as illustrated by Fakhry et al. 
(2016), certainly the asymmetrical effect had the impact of raising the levels of 
sensitivity to shocks in all the observed markets. 
The β coefficients hint at a low level of volatility persistence in the observed 
markets during the financial crisis. This is to be expected since during the financial 
crisis, the financial market experienced a constant flight to safety and the US and 
German markets are regarded as the safe havens.  In contrast the GIPS nations 
were not only perceived to be of a lower quality or liquid but also due to the 
German market being the key market in the Eurozone. Not surprisingly during the 
financial crisis as illustrated by Fakhry et al. (2016), the asymmetrical effect had 
the impact of rising the β coefficients of all the observed markets and hence the 
levels of persistence in the markets. 
The EMH test statistics resultsinnot rejecting the null hypothesis of the market, 
being too volatile to be efficient in all the observed markets. With the exception of 
the Portuguese market, the EMH test statistics are significantly greater than the F-
statistic. As explained in Fakhry et al. (2016), during the financial crisis market 
participants were engaging in flights to liquidity or quality meaning that prices 
were trending upwards faster than the fundamental value.  As Fakhry et al. (2016) 
hints, the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect did not have a significant impact on 
the EMH test statistics.   
6.2. Sovereign Debt Crisis Period (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
Table 3 are associated with the Eurozone sovereign debt and US fiscal cliff 
crises.  Essentially, the sovereign debt crises was the product of the governments 
providing much needed capital for the banking system and following a fiscal 
stimulus policy to support the economy after the financial crisis. This added a 
substantial amount to an already large total debt. However, as previously explained 
an influencing factor to bear in mind is the maturity effect. Another influencing 
factor is in order to provide liquidity and boost the economy, many central banks 
embarked on a quantitative easing policy; this helped maintain the artificially high 
prices and more importantly low yields in some markets. 
The asymmetrical coefficients are indicating a leverage effect during the period 
accounting for the sovereign debt crisis. With the exception of the Greek market, 
the evidence seems to be pointing at a significant leverage effect. Interestingly, the 
asymmetrical coefficient of the Greek market is insignificantly low considering the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis. As highlighted on numerous times previously, the size 
and liquidity of the Greek market may provide a partial explanation. However, the 
asymmetrical coefficients for the remaining observed markets hint at a mixed 
picture with the Portuguese and Spanish markets hinting at a highly significant 
leverage effect. The argument is as discussed earlier; the Portuguese market is of a 
similar in size and liquidity to the Greek market and therefore should response to 
events in similar fashion. The answer probably lays in the timing of the crises in 
both markets while the Greek crisis occurred at the start of the subsample period, 
the impact of the crisis did not spread to the Portuguese market until mid-2010. It is 
worth noting that the price of the Portuguese bond was not consistently below 100 
until end of March 2011 while the price of the Greek bond was consistently below 
100 from the end of January 2010. Another key factor is since for the asymmetrical 
coefficient to be insignificant, the market has to be indifferent between the positive 
and negative impact. This is the key issue underpinning the Greek market over the 
duration of this period; the impact on the volatility from the Greek crisis was short 
and had sharp negative and positive impacts. Although a hike in volatility affected 
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the Portuguese market, it was not as sharp and short as the Greek market; hence, 
the estimated GJR-GARCH model was able to observe a high leverage effect in the 
Portuguese market. However, another key explanation as to the significant of the 
asymmetrical coefficient in the Portuguese market is in the estimation model, due 
to an error in the estimation we had to use the BHHH optimization. This had a 
bigger impact on the asymmetrical coefficient. 
The interesting factor is the significantly low α coefficient of the Greek market, 
which seems to be contradicting Fakhry et al. (2016). The Greek α coefficient 
seems to be suggesting the lowest level of sensitivity to market shocks observed in 
both models thru all observations. The other key statistics observed in the Greek 
market provide a clue, which seem to be pointing at an insignificant impact 
throughout. Hence, the impact from the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect seems 
to have rendered all coefficients of the Greek market insignificant during the 
sovereign debt crisis.   
 
Table 3. EMH Test Statistics (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
 Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
0.034489 
(0.100328) 
0.002517 
(4.29E-05) 
0.005097 
(0.000137) 
0.003162 
(8.54E-05) 
b 
0.982734 
(0.004985) 
0.969560 
(0.001634) 
0.984177 
(0.000865) 
0.999832 
(0.001766) 
u 
1.138810 
(0.038076) 
0.829390 
(0.012387) 
0.745970 
(0.012060) 
0.836750 
(0.012703) 
Variance 
Equation 
ω 
0.697604 
(0.104858) 
1.46E-07 
(3.20E-08) 
4.42E-07 
(2.02E-07) 
5.17E-07 
(1.55E-07) 
α 
0.711551 
(0.179001) 
2.093871 
(0.318346) 
2.195565 
(0.236310) 
2.775620 
(0.592585) 
β 
-0.00614 
(0.000157) 
0.055148 
(0.026693) 
0.267627 
(0.014937) 
0.094363 
(0.024345) 
γ 
-0.02664 
(0.256421) 
-0.50411 
(0.423612) 
-0.95724 
(0.285304) 
-1.00184 
(0.551071) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood -581.148 2732.289 1230.006 2080.447 
R2 0.985480 0.983567 0.986223 0.984275 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat 0.529406 0.414409 0.360457 0.405921 
ARCH Effect 110.0445 5.560962 7.049023 0.131579 
Jarque=Bera 1069.557 143.1955 212.1249 238.6358 
Standard 
Deviation 11.48550 0.064861 1.517370 0.190863 
EMH Test 
EMH Test 
Statistics -0.02797 9.942986 0.333442 4.548493 
Efficiency Accept Reject Accept Reject 
 
The “α” coefficients reflect the diverse impacts of the sovereign debt crisis on 
the observed markets. The significant α coefficient of the Spanish market 
issuggesting a high level of sensitivity to market shocks. Although the Spanish 
market did not feel the impact of the sovereign debt crisis until the later parts, yet a 
combination of a weakening economy, continuation of the financial crisis and weak 
local government finance at a time when the spotlight was on government spending 
did make the Spanish market highly sensitivity to market shocks. Even before the 
financial crisis, the Italian debt to GDP ratio was the highest in the Eurozone, 
hence with such a high ratio the Italian market was highly sensitive to market 
shocks. Although the α coefficients of the Portuguese market were high, however 
they are not that high. As previously suggested, a possible explanation is size and 
liquidity of the market. Another explanation is the quick reaction of the Portuguese 
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government, IMF and European Community to the Portuguese crisis. As illustrated 
by Fakhry et al. (2016), the asymmetrical effect did have an impact on the α 
coefficients for the markets raising the levels of sensitivity to market shocks. 
Since all the coefficients of the Greek market rendered insignificant by the GJR-
GARCH model, the “β” coefficients for the remaining observed markets paint a 
rather mixed picture. While the Portuguese market seems to be suggesting a high 
level of persistence in the market, the Italian and Spanish markets are hinting at 
insignificant β coefficients. Interestingly this means that three of the four GIPS 
markets have insignificant levels of persistence. As illustrated by Fakhry et al. 
(2016), with the exception of the Spanish market, the inclusion of the asymmetrical 
effect seems to have increased the volatility persistence of the observed markets in 
the aftermath of a shock. 
As suggested in Fakhry et al. (2016), the fundamentals of the sovereign debt 
markets were already highlighting many issues such as high longer-term 
unemployment and high debt/deficit in the GIPS countries. However, during any 
crisis, human nature dictates that market participants react to events rather than the 
fundamentals of the asset. This is the key to understanding the significant 
acceptance of the null hypothesis of the markets being too volatile to be efficient 
with regard to the Italian and Spanish markets. During the early stages of the 
sovereign debt crisis, these markets were seen as risk free and liquid markets, 
hence the upwards trend continued making them more predictable. However, of 
greater interest is the Greek and Portuguese markets acceptance of the efficient 
market hypothesis, even though the Greek coefficients are not reliable. A possible 
explanation is that market participants had no option other than to accept the price 
as given by the fundamentals because the market was no longer dictating the price.  
In other words, the market participants were increasingly reacting to the 
fundamental information rather than events, which especially in the case of Greece 
shows that market participants obviously were not aware or did not take into 
account the reliability of the Greek national accounts. Although the inclusion of the 
asymmetrical effect did not have an impact on the resulting efficiency of the 
market, however it did decrease the EMH test statistics as pointed by Fakhry et al. 
(2016).   
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced an asymmetrical volatility test to analyse the 
efficiency of the market during different periods. In order to analyse the impact of 
the asymmetrical effect on the efficiency of the market, we extended Fakhry & 
Richter (2015) in using a GJR-GARCH.  We estimated the excess volatility in the 
GIPS sovereign debtmarkets, in a fast changing environment encompassing fixed 
periods of high and low volatility. By using daily data, we had enough degrees of 
freedom to create subsamples where we could test each subsample individually. 
The aim was to find out how the 2008 financial crisis and 2009 sovereign debt 
crisis may or may not have changed the efficiency of the financial markets. 
To summarise, the results from our asymmetrical volatility test indicatethat the 
asymmetrical effect has an impact on the EMH test statistics. In comparison to the 
results in Fakhry et al. (2016), the EMH test statistics appear to have increased in 
general. This meant that with the exception of the Spanish market that was already 
efficient, the other marketsare now accepting the efficient market hypothesis 
during the pre-crisis period. However, both the financial and sovereign debt crisis 
periods did reflect the efficiency status of Fakhry et al. (2016).    
A relevant factor raised by our empirical evidence regarding the efficient 
market hypothesis is that during some highly volatile periods some markets seem 
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to be rejecting the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  
As hinted by Kirchler (2009), the underreaction / overreaction hypothesis provides 
one possible explanation, which suggests that market participants‟ reaction leads to 
overvaluation or undervaluation during bulls or bears market respectively. Hence, a 
highly volatile period with instances of both a bear and bull market would give the 
impression of an efficient market.  This is what seems to have happened during 
these periods as market participants reacted to the information and news.  
Following Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016), a key finding in 
the evidence is the reaction of the market participants depend on the observed 
periods. Thus meaning market participants‟ reactions could be reflecting the 
general market environment. Therefore, hinting at possible regime switching in the 
reaction of market participants.  
Therefore, future research may involve usinsg a switching GARCH model to 
analyse the impact of high and low volatility on the efficiency of the market. The 
second is as proposed in the introduction to use an index of the sovereign debt 
market to better analyse and compare the markets. An advantage with the use of an 
index is that it has a longer period of observation, this means we analyse the impact 
of the Euro on the efficiency of the GIPS sovereign debt markets. 
It is clear that market participants were acting under uncertainty and lack of full 
information. Therefore, the results back the conclusions of Fakhry & Richter 
(2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016) in that it is more appropriate speak of bounded 
rationality than irrationality. Thus further confirming that financial markets are not 
as efficient as assumed, especially in the neoclassical theory. 
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